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A consensus exists in the literature on the strong link between air connectivity and economic growth 
and development. The need for connecting people and markets is part of national policies in different 
territories. The existence of remote areas, that is, those that under strict market criteria would not be 
transport supplied due to lack of commercial profitability, has led to the development of different public 
policies aimed to support air connectivity in regions where commercial airline operations are not viable. 
This paper provides a mapping of existing policies applied worldwide to provide air connectivity to 
remote areas, and critically reviews policies promoting air connectivity, including: 1) route-based 
policies; 2) passenger-based policies; 3) airline-based policies; and 4) airport-based policies. This effort is 
the first to compile and critically analyze all the existing alternatives to provide air connectivity in 
remote areas and to report on experiences worldwide. Moreover, we develop a novel taxonomy of 
existing public policies when it comes to providing air connectivity to remote areas.  After reviewing 
different policy options and instruments applied globally, the paper ends with a policy discussion.   
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1.  Introduction 
The provision of air connectivity represents a key factor for a region’s integration and development.1 
According to the International Air Transport Association–IATA (2016), air passenger demand worldwide 
has experienced a 3.7% annual compound average growth rate over the last decade. The spectacular 
growth in the international air transport market and the accompanying development of new markets 
has greatly contributed to improved global connectivity.  
                                                          
1 The key role played by air transport in trade and development outcomes across countries is well documented 
(Arvis and Sheperd, 2011). Authors point to the importance of air transport in promoting efficient delivery times, 
consistency of deliveries, and reasonable transport costs, thus enhancing product competitiveness on international 
markets. The more favorable trade outcomes support higher GDP growth, with the added benefit of global citizens 





Given the link between air connectivity and trade and development, policymakers are keenly 
interested in appropriate mechanisms to effectively promote air transport to remote areas otherwise 
excluded under normal markets conditions. Indeed, not all routes are economically interesting for 
airlines. Sometimes we find regions, communities, or routes where free-market conditions would not 
facilitate the development of proper transport connections. This is due to the inherent nature of air 
transportation costs, which are subject to high fixed costs of operation, allowing supply only at relatively 
high levels of passenger transport. Achieving economies of scale is least likely in routes to / from remote 
areas. 
Given the nature air transport supply, remote regions, isolated communities, and non-commercial 
routes or destinations all represent causes for the establishment of policies aimed to provide air 
connectivity to places that under normal circumstances would have lacked them. It can be argued that 
air transport services are a social right of inhabitants. In practice, Public Service Obligations (PSOs) in 
Europe and Essential Air Services (EASs) in the U.S. represent the most documented policies. Many other 
countries engage in these policies as well, but there are generally less specifics on these policy schemes. 
While there is no unambiguous definition of “remoteness” when it comes to air connectivity (and 
governments use terms such as remote region, isolated communities, essential services, and non-
commercially viable interchangeably), we can agree that all related policies involve situations where 
there is a claimed need for third party involvement, that is, the public sector, to provide a service and 
connect a region or community. This is most often accomplished by means of subsidies from the central 
government or local authorities (Bråthen and Halpern, 2012). Following related literature, in this paper 
we employ “remote areas/regions” to refer to all abovementioned realities.  
Like the definition of remote area itself, policy-specific objectives differ widely across the known 
experiences. In some cases, the priority is to guarantee “lifeline services” in areas with difficult terrain or 
weather, where land transportation is not a real option due to the distance to the closest urban center. 
In other cases, the focus is to guarantee the connection with the national air transport system in places 
that are not able to generate sufficient demand to attract commercial services by airlines. Other policies 
guarantee a minimum supply of domestic flights in cases where flight frequencies are necessary but are 
low in the off-peak season or during certain times of the day (i.e., non-commercially viable).  
Alternatively, the policy objective may be to promote national cohesion by sustaining air services in 





A varied set of policies have been implemented around the world to support air services in the 
abovementioned cases where commercial operations by airlines are not viable, including from the initial 
experiences of PSOs in Europe and EASs in the U.S., to the most recent cases of Peru or Colombia, 
among others. Although they all have a similar philosophy – providing air connectivity to what each 
government considers a remote area– they all have remarkable differences and impacts from a public 
policy perspective. In this sense, the choice among alternative policies becomes a difficult task. After 
reviewing experiences worldwide, we group these policies in the following categories: 1) route-based 
policies; 2) passenger-based policies; 3) airline-based policies; and 4) airport-based policies. Note that 
some countries may have a combination of these policies addressing air connectivity in remote regions, 
as will be discussed later. Figure 1 maps the main policies used to provide air connectivity to remote 
regions and some country examples – that will be specifically analyzed in the next sections – in the 
application of the different schemes.  




2. Route-based policies: the most widely used instrument to link remote areas 
The most widely used instrument to provide connection to isolate communities worldwide is the 
imposition of public service obligations (PSOs) in specific routes. Previous literature has focused on 
PSOs, which represent one of the alternatives that governments have at their disposal to provide 
connectivity (Williams and Pagliari, 2004; Calzada and Fageda, 2012; among many others). This policy 





examples of the imposition of PSOs are in the United States, country members of the European Union, 
and Australia. While the details of PSOs vary by country, PSOs are short-term contracts set by the 
government with airlines that may specify the service levels, including flight frequency, the type of 
plane, scheduling, and fares to be offered in the route. In return for meeting these requirements, an 
airline may receive a subsidy, and it is usually protected from the entry of other airlines.  
There are a variety of elements to analyze regarding the specific implementation of these policies.  
We may characterize route-based policies according to 1) the scale of the program; 2) the institutional 
framework; 3) the eligibility criteria for regions; 4) the selection criteria of carriers; 5) the service levels 
and fares; and 6) the scope of competition. Table 1 summarizes these variables and their different 
dimensions. This section follows this scheme to further compare policy options and adequacy of the 
instruments based on a comprehensive review of all known experiences worldwide. 
 
Table 1. Variables and dimensions to articulate policies to provide air connectivity to remote areas 
 
Scale of the program Number of routes served, amount of resources allocated 
Institutional 
framework 
Central government, regional government, local communities 
Criteria for eligibility of 
regions 
Use of specific or discretional rules, density of traffic, opportunities 
for intermodal competition, network or point-to-point links 
Criteria for selection of 
carriers  
Voluntary, decentralized in the communities, competitive 
Adequacy of service 
levels and fares 
Frequencies, fares, load factors, type of aircraft 
 
Scope of competition Entry restricted or not, potential number of bidders, objective or 
discretional criteria to select carriers 
Source: authors. 
Tables A1 and A2 in the annex provide some details of the PSO programs applied in different countries. 
The main programs in terms of number of routes served and the amount of resources spent can be 
found in the U.S. and the European Union. Hence, we provide more details of the schemes implemented 
there.2 Note that these have also been the experiences that have received more attention in the 
literature.  
                                                          
2 Some additional information on PSO programs can be found in ICAO (2005), Braathen (2011), Metrass-Mendes et 





Also note that the imposition of public service obligations by a government must meet the rules defined 
in a general law that, in some cases, can be issued by a government of a higher territorial level. This is 
the case, for example, of the European Union where national governments must meet the guidelines 
defined in a European Law. 
a. The European Union experience: High heterogeneity and discretional criteria 
In the European Union (EU), the programs are set under a common legal framework defined by the 
European Commission.3,4 However, the national governments within the EU have autonomy in the 
designation of protected regions, the determination of service levels and fares, and the magnitude of 
the subsidies.  
The general aim of the legislation by the European Commission is to guarantee air services in poor 
regions or thin routes where air transportation provides vital economic links. Here, it is explicitly stated 
that surface transportation should not be a viable option, but the definition of a poor region or thin 
route is left to the interpretation of the national governments that effectively implement the program. 
Hence, other objectives may guide the policy, such as maintaining social cohesion and promoting 
tourism (Williams, 2010). Note that, in contrast to the U.S. policy under EAS, connections between small 
airports in EU countries are allowed.  
Despite the autonomy in the designation of protected routes, national governments of the EU must 
follow the same procedures in awarding contracts. Specifically, governments issue an invitation to 
tender, which is published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The tender stipulates the 
service levels, which vary from country to country. Frequency floors and minimum number of seats are 
also always required. Other common requirements include earliest departure times and latest arrival 
times to guarantee daily round-trips. The maximum number of stops between airports and maximum 
wait times between flights can also be set, along with specific aircraft features (jets vs. turbo-props). In 
some cases, maximum total or average airfare values are imposed, as well as discount rates for residents 
or travelers with special needs. 
If one or several airlines can meet the requirements set in the tender, then the government does not 
restrict market entry and flights are offered without the need of subsidies. Otherwise, the carriers bid 
for a subsidy to operate the route for a short period as a monopoly. Renegotiations of contracts are 
                                                          
3 The legal framework is contained in Article 4 of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2408/92 on “Access for Community 
Air Carriers to Intra-Community Air Routes.” 





possible if airlines demonstrate they cannot provide the service without losses under the existing 
conditions of a contract. 
Routes operated under a PSO contract have been increasing in the last years. In 2015, the number of 
protected routes was about 240. Information on the amount of subsidies is difficult to obtain as some 
countries, for instance, Italy and France, do not report on subsidy values on some routes. Nevertheless, 
the total amount of subsidies spent by European countries is thought to be well above 200 million USD 
annually.  
Several studies have analyzed PSOs implemented in European countries. Some have done cross-
country analysis, such as Williams and Pagliari (2004), who criticize the high diversity in the PSO regimes 
applied in European countries. They stress that PSO designation seems to be arbitrary, benefiting 
remote regions in Scotland and Norway but also dense routes in islands in France, Italy, and Spain that 
receive a lot of tourists. In a similar vein, Williams (2010) provides data to show the high variation 
between countries in average subsidy per passenger and route maximum fares. To this point, Brathen 
and Halpern (2012) suggest that varied conditions, for instance, different competitive environments or 
different levels of asset specificity connected to the contract may justify the diversity.  
Another group of studies that use cross-country data focus on the limited competition associated 
with PSOs contracts. In this regard, Merkert and Williams (2013) analyze the efficiency of 18 European 
airlines operating PSO routes in 2008-2009. The authors find that in the early months of the PSO 
contract, airlines perform better than when the contract approaches termination. This suggests that 
operators have few incentives to increase efficiency before the tender finishes due to the absence of 
competition. To this point, the few number of bidders (in many cases just one) and the short time 
allowed between notification that an airline has been selected in the tender and when it must start 
operations contributes to the lack of competition in the market (O’Fee, 2003).  
Furthermore, Calzada and Fageda (2014) develop an econometric analysis of the determinants of 
competition using a sample of routes (protected and unprotected by PSOs) for five large European 
countries; France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Their results suggest that, in 
comparison with similar unprotected routes, PSOs tend to reduce the intensity of competition at the 
route level.  
Some studies have analyzed the PSO mechanism for a specific European country. For Spain, Calzada 





domestic market and find that prices are lower and frequencies are higher in routes regulated by PSOs 
contracts.5  
For Norway, Lian and Ronnevik (2011) explain that residents in remote regions prefer to go by car to 
the larger airport and that this behavior undermines PSO services when a main airport is in the 
proximity. The reason for the airport leakage is that maximum fares regulated in the PSO contracts cover 
point-to-route flights, but not indirect flights, and air fares are much higher in routes departing from 
smaller airports. Hence, travelers prefer to spend more ground travel time to pay a lower air fare.6  
Angelopoulos et al. (2012) find inconsistencies in the designation of PSO routes in Greece and also 
the average amount of subsidies per passenger7, while Pagliari (2012) provides data that suggests that 
air fares would be higher and more unstable in routes connecting the Italian mainland and Sardinia if 
PSOs were eliminated.8 Finally, Pita et al. (2013) propose an operational planning model to examine the 
                                                          
5 In Spain, PSOs were first imposed for routes within the Canary and Balearic Islands in 1998. The objective was to 
compensate residents in these regions for the costs of their insularity. The requirements in terms of service levels 
and maximum fares were met on a subsidy basis although regional governments and lobbies linked to the tourist 
sector put pressure for a change on the price scheme. Hence, new contracts were set in 2006 with a more flexible 
price schedule. Moreover, for the thinnest routes of the Canary Islands, a new contract was set in 2012 in which a 
subsidy was granted in exchange of restricting entry. Currently under discussion is the establishment of a flat rate 
for residents in the islands, as local citizens, firms, and public authorities complain that fares are too high.  
6 In Norway, PSO contracts have been in effect since the EU introduced the program in 1997. This replaced a 
system of licenses, under which carriers accepted an obligation to serve one or more routes in return for a 
monopoly in the given sector(s). Under the former regime, cross subsidization of routes was achieved through the 
assignment of sets of "profitable" and "less profitable" routes to individual carriers. Note that in the current 
system, Widerøe airlines dominates most of the contracts so that implicit cross-subsidization may still be in place.  
7 In Greece, the first ten PSO air transport routes were tendered in 2001, and another tender for an extra nine 
routes was introduced the following year. The last tenders for 26 air transport PSO routes were announced in 
2011, for which the duration of the contracts is four years (2012-2016). On all routes, the maximum PSO fare level, 
the minimum number of roundtrips, and the weekly number of offered seats are set by the authorities as a part of 
the tender requirements.  
8 Devoto et al. (2016) explain the evolution of PSOs in Sardinia. The first PSO with subsidized airfares was set in 
place in 2002, lasting two years, on routes from Sardinia’s three regional airports to Rome and Milan. In 2004, a 
new PSO contract was set for one year without financial compensation for airlines but with maximum fares. A free 
market was effectively in place in 2006-2007 after some legal vicissitudes for the new contract. A high increase in 
air fares is documented for these years. In 2008–2009, a new PSO contract was introduced with no compensation 
to airlines but with more airlines operating the routes, more protected links to Sardinia’s airports (including 
Bologna, Turin, Florence, Verona, Naples, and Palermo), and a further increase in fares. The following period was 
marked by appeals from the excluded airlines, extensions and delays in the preparation of the 2010–2011 tender, 
and the 2012 tender for which no bids were received. In November 2013, a new PSO was introduced with financial 
compensation for three years. Note also that the PSO contracts in Sardinia have usually incorporated a discount 
scheme for residents. Currently, there is a flat rate for Sardinian residents. Moreover, this flat rate is different 
depending on the period of the year: from September 16th to August 14th there is a flat rate for all passengers, 
resident or not. For the rest of the year, there is a discount for resident passengers only. <This represents just one 
month—please check the dates.  If it is just one month, then the wording in the last sentence should be revised to 





design of subsidized air transportation, and apply this methodology to assess the Azores PSO system. 
They present a flight scheduling and fleet assignment optimization model that could be adopted by 
public authorities when designing air transport networks to minimize total social costs.  
Overall, the main criticisms of the European system are the high heterogeneity in the policy across 
countries (and even within countries) and the discretional criteria for eligible routes, fares, service 
levels, and amount of subsidies. Furthermore, entry barriers in the tendering process are apparent due 
to the lack of transparency and the fact that there is just one month between notification of the tender 
and submission of bids. Finally, PSOs may be benefiting very dense routes (i.e., tourist islands). In terms 
of strengths of the European program, we can mention that some government protected routes are 
open to competition and do not require subsidies, which benefits communities with no surface 
transportation options (“lifeline” services). 
 
b. USA: More clarity, although not specifically to “remote” areas  
The U.S. uses a PSO scheme called the Essential Air Service (EAS) program to provide subsidies to 
airlines that serve 115 eligible communities (outside of Alaska) and 44 communities in Alaska. 
Anticipating that airlines would focus their operations on high-density routes, Congress established the 
EAS program as part of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.9 Under the EAS program, if an airline 
cannot provide air service to eligible communities without incurring a loss, the federal government 
provides an airline a subsidy to serve those communities. The scale of the EAS scheme, in terms of the 
number of protected routes and resources spent, is similar to the entire EU program.  
In contrast to the EU experience, the designation of protected routes is clearly specified. Protected 
communities must have had air services before the liberalization, be located more than 70 miles from a 
large airport, and meet some thresholds regarding a minimum amount of traffic and a maximum 
required subsidy for passengers. To this point, dense routes cannot be subsidized, and there is an 
emphasis on network connectivity. However, as a shortcoming, it can be said that eligibility is based on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
9 The EAS program was initially effective for 10 years, ending in 1988. However, in 1996, the U.S. Congress decided 
to make it permanent. Since then, Congress has amended the eligibility criteria several times to reduce costs of the 
program and mitigate the variation in the levels of subsidies per passenger across the protected routes. In this 
regard, the distance criterion to the closest hub has suffered several changes. Notably, in 2011, Congress set a per 
passenger cap of $1,000 regardless of the distance from a hub and imposed a minimum level of passengers to 





“to be thin” rather than “to be remote.” In this regard, several protected routes are short enough to 
make viable the use of surface transportation modes.  
Once it is demonstrated that the route cannot be operated on a commercial basis, airlines interested 
in receiving subsidies make proposals that include flight frequencies, the size of the connecting hub, 
aircraft equipment, schedules, and fares. In contrast to the EU scheme, subsidies are calculated through 
objective parameters, while the selection of the carrier includes several factors beyond the subsidy 
required. Finally, as in the EU scheme, contracts are for a short-term period.  
The EAS scheme in the U.S. has also been examined in some studies.10 Reports from the U.S. 
Government Accounting Office (2009, 2014) suggest two weaknesses of the EAS system: 1) the high 
variation in the amount of subsidies per passenger that is explained by the fact that payments are made 
on a per-flight basis and not on a per-passenger basis; and 2) subsidized routes are underutilized so that 
load factors are low in EAS routes in comparison to unprotected routes. However, it is also recognized 
that only airports in eligible communities that received EAS-subsidized service have experienced an 
increased number of flights since 2007. 
Metrass-Mendes and de Neufville (2010) show some efficiency gains from EAS, mostly attributable to 
the policy of encouraging competition between air carriers seeking to provide service to eligible 
communities. However, they also state that the EAS system is not considering the changing conditions in 
the aviation market, the speed of surface transportation, and the distribution of the population within 
the country since deregulation in 1978. The latter is also suggested by Grubesic and Matisziw (2011) and 
Özcan (2014a).   
Grubesic and Matisziw (2011) reveal the presence of a high level of redundant coverage within the 
EAS network. Furthermore, they claim that many air links are short enough to be covered by ground 
transportation. Nevertheless, Özcan (2014b) demonstrates that EAS communities that could sustain 
their subsidized flights experienced had higher per capita income growth in the 1999-2011 period than 
did ex-EAS communities that lost their flights because of non-eligibility. Finally, a few studies made 
comparative analysis of the European and U.S. experiences with PSOs policies. Santana (2009) examines 
the impact of PSOs on the productive efficiency of European and U.S. airlines for the period 1991-2002 
                                                          
10 These studies generally do not consider communities in Alaska, which are subject to much more flexible 





and finds that PSOs increased the operation costs of European carriers; author does not observe a 
similar effect in the U.S. system.  
Wittman et al. (2016) classify routes per their goals and network structures in a comparative analysis 
that includes the U.S. and the EU. They identify PSO schemes aimed to provide network access. Such 
schemes emphasize onward connections for residents in remote or small communities, connecting 
inhabitants to a larger range of cities. This would be the case of the U.S. model. Furthermore, they 
consider PSO schemes focused on guaranteeing lifeline services, which means that PSOs provide point-
to-point links that connect remote regions with a nearby urban center. This would be the case, for 
example, of Norway or Sweden. In other cases, as in France, Portugal, or Scotland, both network access 
and lifeline services exist, as PSOs connect remote territories, such as islands, to each other and to 
mainland hubs.  
 
c. Other specific/s route/s-based policies worldwide: Australia, Malaysia, Peru, and Chile 
The Australian Federal Government implemented a PSO scheme in 1983 called the Remote Air 
Service Subsidy (RASS). The objective of this program is to ensure communities in remote and thin route 
areas have access to air services for the transportation of passengers and essential goods by subsidizing 
a regular weekly flight. Communities willing to receive RASS services must meet two requirements: a 
demonstrated need for a weekly air service, and being sufficiently remote in terms of surface travel 
time. The RASS Scheme provides direct support to air services in 257 communities, including 86 
indigenous communities. An important fact to consider with this program is that the population range of 
the protected communities is from 6 to 200 people. The total budget of the program is about 14 million 
USD.11 
Australia is divided into 10 geographical regions under the RASS Scheme. Airlines are contracted for a 
short-term period with the Australian Government through a competitive tendering that must meet the 
Commonwealth Procurement Rules to provide air services in each area (each area has a single 
operator).  The Scheme operates on a fixed annual budget. The capacity to admit communities is limited 
by the budget available for RASS activities in any given year, and all prior financial commitments are 
considered. 
                                                          
11 In addition, the state governments of Queensland and South Australia both subsidize regional airlines serving 
specific remote routes. Note also that in four states, incumbent airlines are protected from competition in intra-






The RAAS scheme does not attract the same level of criticism as do the U.S. and EU programs (RP 
Eriksson and Associates, 2015). This may be explained by the smaller scale of the program and the well-
defined criteria for designating protected communities and subsidies. In this regard, Merkert and 
Hensher (2013) analyze differences between the PSO schemes in Europe and Australia. They conclude 
that the Australian model is simpler and clearer, and contracts tend to be more complete. Indeed, some 
of the strengths of the Australian program include the objective determination of the subsidy, the 
transparency of the tendering procedure, and that it benefits very remote and small communities.  
In Malaysia, a specific type of PSO program is also in place called the Rural Air Services (RAS) Scheme. 
In contrast to the other programs examined, the RAS scheme is based on a long-term contract between 
the government and MASwings, which is a subsidiary of Malaysia airlines, a state-owned firm. Hence, 
the contracts are not awarded through a tender in a competitive procedure, which is a clear 
shortcoming of the program. With their contract, MASwings provides services within the regions of 
Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo. MASwings operates 49 RAS routes with small aircrafts. Note that entry is 
open to other airlines and fares and service levels are not regulated.  
The full cost for the operation of RAS routes by MASwings is fully paid by the Malaysian Government 
in the form of subsidies and aircraft rental payment. Hence, there are no clear incentives to keep the 
subsidies at a minimum. The annual budget of the program is about 3 million USD.  Furthermore, 
MASwings does not have to pay the goods and services tax in protected routes.  
The two explicit objectives of the Malaysia program are to promote national integration by 
enhancing connectivity between the mainland and Borneo and to support travel for rural communities 
where air transport has become the main mode of connection to the outside world. One of the 
advantages of the program is that it emphasizes network connectivity, as the protected routes address 
the links between the regional capitals and smaller airports. However, a clear shortcoming is that some 
of the protected routes are dense routes. In fact, dense routes are also served by private airlines, which 
undermine the rationale of the subsidies. Currently, a new contract between the government and 
MASwings is being negotiated that includes fewer resources and less routes protected.  
In Peru, there is a PSO scheme (Programa de Integración Amazónica por vía Aérea) that subsidizes 
routes within the Amazonas that link the four main airports with smaller airports. Hence, network 
connectivity is emphasized and the program benefits very remote and small communities. Currently, 





(renewable for another year), but there is a lack of transparency regarding the carrier selection criteria 
and the determination of the amount of subsidies. Flight frequencies and the type of aircraft are 
regulated, and flat rates are also set. 
Finally, in Chile subsidies have been awarded through a competitive tender to provide air services in 
the region of Magallanes y Antártica Chilena. Currently, only two routes that link the regional capital 
with smaller airports benefit from these subsidies. The contract is for three years, and it specifies the 
flight frequency, the type of aircraft to be used, and the flat rates.  
 
d. Traffic distribution rules: The case of India 
Another policy option is the implementation of traffic distribution rules that imply a cross-
subsidization between dense and thin routes. India is the most relevant example of the implementation 
of this policy, defined in a specific law. 
The policy used in India to support air services in remote regions is what it is called the Route Dispersal 
Guidelines (RDGs), which forces airlines to distribute traffic across three categories of airports. Under 
this program, which was set in 1994, routes are classified in three categories: Category I, II and III. 
Category I includes routes from Bombay, Calcutta, and Delhi to other large cities. Category II includes 
airports in the North-East region, Jammu and Kashmir, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and Lakshadweep. 
Category III includes airports and routes other than those in I and II. 
The RDG program states that any airline that operates scheduled air transport service on one or 
more of the routes under Category I shall be required to provide service in Categories II & III as follows:  
 
 Deploy at least 10% of the capacity deployed on routes in Category I on routes in Category II.  
 Of the capacity required to be deployed on Category II routes, deploy at least 10% on services 
operated exclusively within Category II.  
 Deploy at least 50% of the capacity deployed on routes in Category I on routes in Category III.  
 Within Category II: Deploy at least 6% of total domestic capacity to airports in remote regions. 
Remote regions are defined as all airports in the North-East except Guwahati and Bagdogra, all 
airports in Jammu and Kashmir except Jammu, all airports in Andaman and Nicobar Islands and 
Lakshadweep. It is mandatory for airlines to operate at least 1% of their total capacity on routes 
operated within these remote regions.  
Airlines offering services in remote areas also enjoy other benefits like tax exemptions (airport 





of seats. The latter implies that a certain number of seats for a specified operator are blocked by the 
government at a pre-specified air fare. The operator must first make efforts to sell all the seats on its 
aircraft. Such selling of seats is done by the operator at market rates. In cases where the operator is not 
able to sell all of the seats, the government makes payment for the blocked number of seats at pre-
decided fares. Finally, some states also arrange subsidies with specific airlines. 
The two explicit objectives of the RDG are to ensure that all regions in India have access to air 
services and to ensure that airlines fulfill some social obligations. Note, however, that the program 
benefits regions like Kashmir and some parts of the North-East that are in dispute with neighboring 
countries so that national integration may also be considered an objective of the program. Currently, 
more than 40 routes that serve remote regions are affected by this policy.  
Several reports by the Indian Government (2014, 2016) have analyzed the main shortcomings of the 
RDG program with the aim of promoting the implementation of a PSO scheme that is currently under 
discussion. The RDG program implies a cross-subsidization between categories of routes such that 
airlines incur losses when operating in airports of category II and must set higher fares in routes from 
category I. Furthermore, the program requires that airlines with a fleet based on big aircrafts must 
operate in category II routes, creating entry barriers for specialized operators (regional carriers) that 
could provide flights with smaller and more efficient aircrafts. Finally, airlines follow a cream skimming 
strategy when operating in categories II and III airports as only state capitals are well served.  
3. Passenger-based policies: discounts to residents 
 
The use of discounts to residents in remote regions (that may be embedded in PSO contracts or not) 
is another policy that can be used by countries.12 Spain is the country spending the most resources with 
this policy. Other examples include Ecuador, Portugal, and Scotland. Discounts to residents can be 
embedded in the public services obligations or they may be granted through a specific law. 
In Spain, all residents of the Canary and Balearic Islands (and Ceuta & Melilla) enjoy a 50% price 
discount in domestic flights, which is financed from public funds (central government).13 Island residents 
                                                          
12 In Europe, these subsidies are an exemption within the general European legislation on state aid rules. 
13In Spain, the first application of legislation in this regard was in 1960. The discounts over market fares have 
increased in successive reforms due to pressures of local interests in the islands. In this regard, the percentage that 
represent the discounts increased from 10% (in application from January 1988 to August 1998), to 33% (in 
application from August 1998 to February 2005), to 38% (in application from February to December 2005), to 45% 





also benefit from lower airport charges. The amount of resources spent in this program is about 300 
million euros per year. In fact, this quantity is higher than the whole PSO program in Europe or the U.S. 
In Scotland, the regional government has introduced a social discount scheme that gives residents 
living in the Highlands and islands a 50% discount on prices. These discounts benefit residents of remote 
communities in areas including Colonsay, Orkney, Shetland, the Western Isles, Islay, Jura, Caithness, and 
North West Sutherland.  
There is a remarkable difference between the discount policies in these two European countries. In 
Scotland, travelers in PSO routes do not enjoy inter-island discounts, while in Spain, inter-island routes 
have PSO contracts and residents reap the benefits of these discounts.  
In Portugal, flat fares are set for residents and students in Azores on domestic flights to Madeira or 
the mainland. Hence, they enjoy subsidies amounting to the difference between the market price and 
the flat rate. Note that in Portugal, discounts have been removed from PSO contracts since 2015. In 
other countries, including France or Italy, residents in islands may enjoy some benefits (i.e., discounts, 
lower maximum fares, flat rates), but these benefits are embedded in PSO contracts. 
Another example of the use of discounts for residents can be found in Ecuador. Residents in 
Galapagos enjoy a flat rate for domestic destinations, and 15 seats on each flight are blocked for 
residents. There is an additional 50% discount for children, the elderly, and residents with special needs. 
Finally, subsidies are granted for travelers with concrete travel needs (medical care, shopping, etc.) in 
some countries. Canada is a good example of this policy.   
Note that an important difference in the discount policy is in the mechanism applied. In some 
countries, residents enjoy of a discount that is computed as a percentage over market fares. This is the 
case of Scotland and Spain. In other countries, residents enjoy flat rates or specific maximum fares. This 
is the case of Ecuador, France, Italy, and Portugal. To this point, Valido et al. (2014) suggests that the 
effects of the different mechanisms are related to the proportion of residents/non-residents and their 
willingness to pay.  
A clear shortcoming of a discount policy is that non-residents that travel to these locations must pay 
the full price of the service, and prices without the discount may be higher. In this regard, the effects of 
discounts to residents in Spain have been examined in three studies. Calzada and Calzada (2012) 
estimate demand and pricing equations with a sample of protected and unprotected routes of the 






domestic market. They find that routes that benefit from price discounts enjoy higher demand but 
prices (without the discount) are also higher. The logic behind these findings is that the discounts cause 
the demand of island residents to be less elastic, while the supply may not respond easily to the 
increased demand. Hence, part of the benefits of the discounts is transferred to the airlines via price 
increases. In a similar vein, Fageda et al. (2012) examine price differences between domestic and 
international routes departing from the airport of Gran Canaria. Controlling for different attributes of 
the routes, they find that prices are higher in domestic routes, which can be explained by the fact that 
residents in the island only enjoy discounts in domestic routes. Finally, Fageda et al. (2016) examine data 
for a period with a change in the proportion of the discount to island residents from 33 to-50%. 
Interestingly, the authors do not find substantial differences in the fares set by airlines with a change in 
the amount of the discount.  
 
4. Airline-based policies: State-owned firms, a likely weak control on financial assistance 
provided 
Social services provided by state-owned airlines constitutes another policy to support air services in 
remote regions. This is the case for countries including Colombia, Ecuador, and Malaysia. Privatization 
and deregulation of airlines has been some processes implemented in many countries around the globe. 
However, we still find several countries that guarantee air services in unprofitable routes through a 
state-owned airline. For our purposes, our interest here is in those countries that have remote regions. 
Examples of countries with state-owned airlines and remote regions include: Algeria (Air Algerie), 
Argentina (Aerolineas Argentinas), Egypt (EgyptAir), Ethiopia (Ethiopian Airlines), Indonesia (Garuda 
Indonesia), Pakistan (PIA), and Russia (Aeroflot). However, these airlines provide air services throughout 
the whole territory and their route network may include a high number of international destinations. 
Hence, it is difficult to disentangle how these countries meet the needs of remote regions as there are 
no specific programs in place.  
To this point, state-owned regional airlines that only operate in small airports of the national system 
may be understood as a more specific policy to address the needs of remote regions. Examples of state-
owned regional airlines can be found in Bolivia (BoA Regional), Colombia (Satena), Ecuador (Tame 
Amazonia), and Malaysia (MASwings).  
In Bolivia, the state-owned airline was created in 2016 as a regional subsidiary with the aim to 





regions.  In the case of Colombia, Satena offers social service route offerings that are unprofitable but 
also commercial services in profitable routes, where it competes with other airlines. Hence, Satena 
covers the social service routes through cross-subsidies from commercial to social services. It also 
receives subsidies from the government to fund losses. A major shortcoming of this model is the 
discretional choice of social destinations so that some remote regions may be not served. Furthermore, 
another disadvantage of the model is the complex definition of subsidies required from government.  
In Ecuador and Malaysia, the flag carriers have subsidiaries that operate exclusively in remote regions  
that rely on government subsidies for their operations. TAME Amazonía operates flights within the 
Amazonas by means of connecting the regional capital with smaller airports. Service levels are specified 
and passengers can fly at a flat rate. In the same vein, MASwings operate flights within the Malaysian 
regions of Borneo, having the regional capitals as operating bases.  
An important difference between the countries under discussion is that in Ecuador air services are 
offered for very remote and thin communities. This is not necessarily the case of Bolivia, Colombia, and 
Malaysia, where dense routes and/or routes with big endpoints may also be served by their state-
owned regional airline.  
Canada represents a special case within the state-owned regional airlines model. In this regard, 
several Inuit and First Nations organizations hold a significant position in support of air accessibility for 
small remote communities in Northern Canada. The most visible mechanism of air service support by 
these organizations is the establishment of fully-owned or joint-venture carriers (Metrass-Mendes et al., 
2011). 
To this point, it is also worth mentioning that state-owned firms may be created explicitly to support 
air services in remote regions as is the case of Canada, Ecuador, and Malaysia. In other countries, as is 
the case of Colombia and Bolivia, the state-owned firm is not aimed explicitly to support air services in 
remote regions, although in practice, some of their routes cover flights to remote regions.  
The main problems with this model is that there are no incentives to promote efficiency. Competition 
is distorted and governments usually have weak control over the direction of any financial assistance 
provided (ICAO, 2005). Furthermore, most of the key decisions for the adequacy of the service (flight 
frequency, fares, subsidies) are discretional.  






Regarding airport programs, we can differentiate between incentives to airlines to launch new routes 
that are channeled through airports and subsidies for expanding or improving the capacity of the 
infrastructure. Note here that in general these programs are not specifically addressed to remote 
regions and usually both small and large airports may take benefit from them. Airport programs, as well 
as state-owned firms, are policies that are usually not derived from a specific law although they may be 
subject to a general legal framework. 
 
a. Carrier incentive schemes (airport fees’ discounts) 
In Europe, it is common to use incentive schemes by regional authorities and/or the airport operator 
to attract airline operations (Malina et al., 2012; Allroggen et al., 2013; Wittman, 2014). These incentives 
may take the form of discounts on airport fees, bonus payments to airlines for a limited period in 
exchange for new routes, guaranteed growth in passengers transported, and joint marketing activities. 
While these initiatives are usually made in small airports, they may also take place in large ones.  
 
Small airports in Europe are usually state-owned so that these payments to airlines may be 
investigated by the European Union as they may be against competition laws regarding state air rules. In 
this regard, the EU guidelines for state aid to airlines specify that public airports with less than 3 million 
passengers per year (or airports in remote regions regardless of size) may offer transparent and non-
discriminating incentives to airlines for additional traffic. Financial support to airlines must not exceed 
extra start-up costs, is limited to 3 years, and competitive tendering is required. In practice, incentive 
schemes do not necessarily meet EU guidelines. In practice, funds may be allocated through bilateral 
agreements (or non-transparent tendering), and subsidies may be much higher than start-up costs. 
Furthermore, the agreement/contract may be for more than 3 years.  
 
In any case, it is important to mention that there is no explicit program either in the EU or at the 
national level so that these incentives are usually not disclosed officially. Hence, it is difficult to obtain 
information about the amount of resources devoted to carrier incentive schemes, although it is thought 
to be quite high. For instance, a report from the competition authority in Spain shows that regional 
governments in Spain spent 250 million euros to finance airline operations located in their territory 
during the period 2007-2011.One example of an official carrier incentive program is the Route 
Development Fund (RDF) that was implemented by the United Kingdom from 2003 to 2007. The goal of 





between airports and airlines through public funding from regional bodies. Funds were allocated to 
routes that could likely become commercially viable after the first three years. The subsidies were 
channeled through airports by applying discounts on airport charges, funding marketing expenses, and 
making payments based on rates per passenger.  Eighty-one routes received funding, and it was mainly 
used by Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales for international routes. It was cancelled in 2007 due to 
the more restrictive criteria of the European Union regarding state aid rules. Smyth et al. (2012) provide 
evidence favorable to this fund. Results of their analysis suggest that the fund significantly increased 
traffic in the airports where it was implemented.  
In contrast to the EU, the U.S. has an explicit and official program targeted to small airports, which is 
known as The Small Community Air Service Development Grant Program. The annual public budget 
devoted to this program is about 10 million USD and no more than 40 airports benefit from it. Hence, it 
is a more modest program than the EAS program, and it certainly uses fewer resources than 
governments in Europe.  
The U.S. federal government provides funds to airports under this grant program to execute specific 
incentive packages to market existing air services or gain additional service. Criteria for communities to 
be eligible are more flexible than in the EAS program. Any small-hub or non-hub airport may be eligible 
and grants can be applied even with unsubsidized commercial air service. 
These U.S. grants may be applied to fund revenue guarantees, airport charges discounts, marketing 
initiatives, studies of air service feasibility, new airport equipment, new airport infrastructure, and other 
incentives. Grant proposals by airports are evaluated based on the following characteristics: higher-
than-average airfares, limited existing service, expected economic impact, and support from the 
communities and airlines. Wittman (2014) analyzes data that suggests that grantees in many cases 
(approximately 60-70%) have been unsuccessful in achieving their proposed goals. He recommends 
more restrictive criteria for eligibility as non-hub airports are more successful than small-hub airports.  
b. Subsidies to airports 
With respect to government subsidies to airports, it must be remarked that many small (even 
medium) airports and/or airports located in remote regions are owned by public entities around the 
world. Hence, subsidies may come from cross-subsidization from large to small airports when 
management of the airport’s national system is centralized. Alternatively, they may come directly from 





An example of state-ownership of airports located in remote regions is that of Canada. Here, airports 
are considered to be remote if air transportation is the only reliable year-round mode of transportation 
available to the community it serves. The Canadian federal government is responsible for the operation 
or funding of 13 remote airports across that country. Several regional governments also have explicit 
programs to support funding of remote airports. Furthermore, there is a specific program (Airports 
Capital Assistance Program) that subsidizes projects aimed at improving safety, protecting assets, and 
reducing operating costs at small airports. In this regard, eligible airports are those not owned by the 
federal government (the 26 largest airports are excluded). Seven hundred and nine million USD have 
been spent through this program for 835 projects at 176 airports since 1995 (Transport Canada: 
https://www.tc.gc.ca).  
In the U.S., the airport improvement program provides grants for projects that promote 
improvements related to safety, capacity, and the environment. However, it is not explicitly designed for 
remote or small communities. Funds to finance this program come from airport charges and fuel taxes. 
The federal government co-funds the costs of this project. It may co-fund 70% of the costs for large 
airports, and 90-95% of the costs for small airports. The federal government spends about 3 billion USD 
per year on this program.  
In Australia, the Remote Airstrip Upgrade Funding Component provides grants specifically for 
projects with airports in remote regions that improve weather capability, safety, and nighttime 
operations. In this regard, the eligible airports/aerodromes must be in remote or very remote regions 
according to the Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA). Furthermore, they have to be 
beneficiaries of the RASS subsidies. Finally, priority is given to indigenous communities.  
The Australian federal government co-funds projects. Co-funding may range from 33-50% of the total 
costs of a project. Criteria for selecting project proposals for funding include the need for enhanced 
safety, economic impact on the community, and maintenance capabilities. The annual budget for this 
program is about 6 million USD. 
In Brazil, the federal government provides co-funding for projects for the improvement or expansion 
of capacity at small and/or unprofitable airports (managed by states/municipalities) through a specific 
program (Programa Federal de Auxílio a Aeroportos). Funds come from taxes paid by concessionaires of 
private airports and the general budget. This program is based on agreements between the federal and 





the tender and supervision oversight rests with the states/municipalities. States must fund 20% of the 
costs. Currently, the federal government has contracts with 8 states, and the amount of resources spent 




6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have reviewed the main policies used to guarantee air connectivity in remote 
regions. Table 3 summarizes the benefits and potential risks of the different policies described in this 
review.  
Table 3. Benefits and potential risks of different policies to support air services in remote regions 
Policy  Benefits         Potential Risks 
Route-based 
policies 
 Transparent and 
structured process 
 Beneficiaries are well 
defined 
 Limits on the amount 
of expenditure 
committed 
 Competition for the 
contract is possible 
 Incomplete contracts 
 May be used for different goals 
 May be an arbitrary choice of: eligible 
routes/communities, carriers, 
subsidies, fares, and service levels 








 No need of direct 
subsidies 
 Private airlines meet 
social goals 
 
 Complex process of monitoring and 
auditing  
 Distortion to competition (implicit 
cross-subsidies, prevent airline 
specialization 
 Hard to guarantee air services in the 




Discount to  
residents 
 Direct benefit to users 
 May benefit travelers 
with special needs 
(medical, students, 
etc.) 
 Harms non-residents 
 Do not discriminate between 
residents according to their 






 Weak risk of effective 
bankruptcy 
 Hard to maintain sustainability due to 
complex cross-subsidies scheme  
 Hard to separate the benefits to 
remote regions 
 May affect the regular market with 










 Engagement of local 
authorities 
 May provide needed 
facilities for airline 
services 
 Hard to guarantee sustainability in 
the long term, subject to political 
decisions 
 May benefit airports not in remote 
regions 




Overall, many of these policies have received criticism. In this regard, it can be stated that in some 
cases the real need of the policy to protect routes is doubtful, as they may be well served by surface 
transportation. In other cases, as is the case of tourist islands in Europe, commercial flights may be 
viable on a subsidy-free basis. Another criticism is the high heterogeneity in these policies in places 
where the scale of the programs applied is high. This is especially the case in the European Union and 
the U.S. Furthermore, it is typical for the designation of eligible routes to be arbitrary, and similarly 
arbitrary with respect to determination of service levels, fares, and subsidies. A further criticism relates 
to the lack of proper incentives to provide air services efficiently and the possible distortion of 
competition, especially in those routes where commercial flights could operate without incentives. Load 
factors in some routes may also be very low. Finally, the consistency between the objectives and the 
results of the policies is not always clear, particularly in the case of the European Union.  
However, what is well documented in the literature is the strong link between air services and 
economic growth. This is particularly true in those regions where surface or maritime transportation is 
not adequate to guarantee their connectivity. Thus, once the need of air services has been 
demonstrated, the discussion should be on the appropriate execution of these policies, rather than on 
justification.   
Clearly, air transportation provides an essential service in remote regions. The reviewed policies have 
a high diversity in their implementation, and many have received considerable criticism. While there is 
room for improvement in implementation, these policies nevertheless contribute to the well-being of 
citizens living in remote regions, although the precise benefits remain mostly unmeasured.  
Some remaining issues are whether the policies reach communities with a real need of government 
intervention; whether there is consistency between the objectives and the results of policies; whether 
the policies appropriately address service levels and fares in protected routes; whether they effectively 





policies efficiently use public resources. These questions constitute an avenue for further research with 
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Table A1. Public service obligations: objectives and communities protected 
Country Objectives Eligibility criteria (communities) 
Australia To guarantee the carriage of passengers and essential goods in remote and isolated areas where a 
regular air service offers the only reliable means of transport.  
 
1. Having a demonstrated need for a weekly service (the location must 
demonstrate that the cost of subsidy-free flights is higher than an equivalent 
service under a subsidy). 2. Being sufficiently remote in terms of surface 
travel (beyond two hours to a population center providing essential goods 
and services; or beyond one hour to a location receiving a weekly subsidy or 
equivalent air service).   
Chile To provide regular air services at a low price in communities with inconvenient access by surface 
transportation. 
Region of Magallanes and Antártica Chilena (links from the regional capital 




A Member State may impose a public service obligation in routes serving a peripheral or 
development region or on a thin route that is considered vital for the economic and social 
development of the region. That obligation shall be imposed only to the extent necessary to ensure, 
on that route, that the minimum provision of scheduled air services satisfy fixed standards of 
continuity, regularity, pricing, or minimum capacity that air carriers would not assume if they were 
solely considering their commercial interest. If alternative modes of transport (i.e., rail) can be used 
on the same origin-destination pair with a travel time of less than three hours, then the necessity 




Malaysia 1. To promote national integration by enhancing connectivity between the Peninsula and Borneo; 2. 
To support rural travel for rural communities where air transport has become the main mode of 
connection to the outside world. 
Routes within Sabah and Sarawak (Borneo) 
Peru To provide regular air services at a low price in small and isolated communities in the Amazonas. Routes within the Amazonas 
United 
States 
To guarantee that small communities that were served by air carriers before deregulation maintain 
a minimal level of scheduled air service and retain a link to the national system. 
 
1. Air services before liberalization; 2. Distance more than 70 miles from a 
hub (large or medium); 3. At least 10 passengers per day; 4. Requiring a 
subsidy per passenger < $1000 (< $200 if distance > 210 miles); 4. Other 
communities can be eligible if regional/local governments share 50% of 













Table A2. Public service obligations: contracts and subsidies 






Australia Tendering has to meet general rules (Commonwealth 
Procurement Rules). Contracts are for 2-3 years. 
 
Safety qualification, financial 
viability, operation ability, 
and amount of subsidy.  
 
Government and interested firms estimate costs. A fixed 
annual budget is allocated for the program (funds for 
additional communities are limited by the budget available and 
prior financial commitments). 
14 (2015)  
Entry, frequencies, 
type of aircraft 
Chile Subsidies within a general legal framework.  Contracts are 
for 3 years. 
 
Amount of subsidy, age of 
the aircraft, experience of 
the pilot, capacity. 










The government issues an invitation to tender that is 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
The tender stipulates service levels and maximum fares. 
There are two tender rounds – the initial tender asks for 
carriers willing to offer a subsidy-free operation; a second 
tender invites carriers to bid based on receiving a subsidy. 
Contracts are for 2-5 years. 
 
Adequacy of the service and 
subsidies (if required).  
 
 







frequencies, type of 
aircraft, scheduling 
(some), fares (some) 
Malaysia Bilateral contract between the central government and a 
state-owned firm. Contracts are for 10 years. 






Peru Tendering process with no transparent criteria. Contracts 
are for 1 year. 
N.A. Subsidies to meet service and fare requirements.  
2 (2016) 
Entry, frequencies, 
type of aircraft, fares 
United 
States 
Tendering for subsidies when it is demonstrated that any 
airline can offer flights without subsidy. Airlines receiving a 
subsidy are obligated to provide service throughout the 
entire duration of the subsidy and may not exit the market 
unless a replacement carrier is found. Contracts are for 2-4 
years. 
 
Reliability and experience to 
provide air services, 
agreements with the 




Estimation of costs based on information about the aviation 
industry’s pricing structure, the size of aircraft required, the 
amount of service required, and the number of projected 
passengers. An annual subsidy is set to compensate the airline 
for the amount by which projected operating costs exceed 
expected passenger revenues as well as a profit element of at 
least 5% of total operating expenses. 
 
250 (2015) 
Frequencies, size of 
the connecting hub, 
aircraft equipment, 
schedule and fares 
 
Note 1: In parentheses dates indicate which year(s) data is available. European countries with information on the amount of subsidies available include: Greece (33), Norway (82), Portugal (68), Spain (5), 
Sweden (9), United Kingdom (6). 
Source: authors. 
